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The Local Fabrication of School Statistics 
Actors, Practices and Issues at Stake in a Primary School in 
Benin 
Sarah Fichtner 
Fondé sur une recherche ethnographique de 12 mois dans une école 
primaire en zone rurale au Bénin en 2012/13 et 2014, l’article 
s’intéresse aux « petits arrangements » autour de la fabrique locale 
des statistiques scolaires : entre exigences internationales, 
stratégies et marges de manœuvre locales. Au travers des exemples 
de deux variables clés qui informent la politique internationale de 
l’Éducation pour tous – l’effectif des élèves et leurs taux de 
redoublement –, l’étude montre comment les acteurs impliqués 
dans l’arène scolaire font, représentent et gouvernent leur école par 
les chiffres. Dans cette perspective, les représentations chiffrées 
constituent surtout des outils de la micropolitique scolaire 
(notamment par rapport aux ressources budgétaires et à la 
réputation de l’école) et de l’(auto)contrôle bureaucratique de ses 
acteurs, plutôt que des instruments fiables pour informer et 
contrôler la macropolitique du développement. 
Based on 12 months of ethnographic research in a primary school in 
rural Benin in 2012/13 and 2014, this paper focuses on the “little 
arrangements” organised around the local fabrication of school 
statistics which arise from the interaction between demands at 
international level, and strategies given room for manoeuvre at 
local level. Based on two key variables central to international 
policies of Education For All, namely school enrolment and 
repetition rates, this study shows how the actors involved in the 
school arena represent, govern and “do the school” through the 
production of these numbers. The data demonstrates that school 
statistics reflect the results of micro-political strategies to enhance 
budget allocation and school reputation, and reflect the 
bureaucratic (self) control of the actors involved, rather than being 
reliable instruments that can inform or measure macro policies of 
development. 
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Introduction1 
With the rise of “neo-liberal bureaucratization” technologies (Hibou, 
2013), focusing on effective management, benchmarking and 
accountability in the public sector (Bruno and Didier, 2013; Ozga et al., 
2009), and within the framework of the global partnerships set up to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals – including Education For All –, 
the quantity, quality and necessity of statistical production have changed, 
particularly in the countries of the Global South. The field of statistics is no 
longer an exclusive domain of the central State2. It is, in addition, a 
mechanism for informing and (self) monitoring a public action that involves 
different actors in “partnership”3. Established for a “more effective” 
government of public policies, this device affects every aspect of the daily 
life of institutions, such as schools in the education sector or hospitals in 
the field of health, where data is produced which then feeds into national 
and international indicators. 
The analytical perspective that guides this article is based on studies on 
statistics and indicators as representations, practices and “quantification 
technologies” which contribute to the production of globalized 
governmental knowledge (Rottenburg et al., 2015; Samuel, 2013). In 
addition, it is influenced by scholarship that analyzes “governance by 
                                                                
1 This is the English version of an article that was written in French (“La fabrique locale des 
statistiques scolaires : acteurs, pratiques et enjeux dans une école primaire au Bénin”) for the 
Revue d’Anthropologie des Connaissances, vol. 10, number 2, 2016, pp. 261-278 (DOI : 
10.3917/rac.031.0261). It has been part of the special issue “Measurements and standards: 
Political technologies in African government” directed by Lydie Cabane & Josiane Tanchou. It 
has been presented at the APAD conference 2015 in Cotonou. The author thanks those 
present at the conference, the anonymous peer reviewers, the editorial board at the Revue 
d’Anthropologie des Connaissances and the coordinators of the special issue for their 
stimulating comments. It is published in Anthropologie & Développement with the consent of 
the editors of the Revue d’Anthropologie des Connaissances. For further information contact 
Marc Barbier, Société d’Anthropologie des Connaissances, UMR LISIS, université Paris-Est 
Marne-la-Vallée.  
2 The term “statistics” derives in its etymology from the notion of knowledge about the State 
(Desrosières, 2000: 16; Foucault, 1991: 138). 
3 The term “partnership” is placed in quotation marks to indicate its problematic neoliberal 
ideological conceptuality that tends to mask the unequal power positions between 
“developers” and “developing countries” (see Abrahamsen, 2004; Lange, 2003). 
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numbers” (Ozga et al., 2009) as a “political technology of the self” (Shore 
and Wright, 2000: 62) with reference to Foucault (1994) and Rose (1991). 
This device, studied here through the process of the local fabrication of 
statistics4, “responsibilizes” the actors in their self-assessments in 
accordance with the conditionalities imposed to positively influence their 
reputation and, further on, their career (Merry, 2011: S90)5. 
Despite the growing interest in analyzing the transformation, effects 
and sociopolitical limits of “school measurements” (Normand, 2005, 2006; 
Cusso, 2008; Deleigne, 2004; Garcia, 2002; Gérard and Pilon, 2005; Samuel, 
2013; Vinokur, 2008), very few studies address what is the focus of this 
article: the production of school statistics at the “grassroots level”. 
Based on ethnographic research of everyday life in a public primary 
school in a village in north-eastern Benin called Alafia, I am interested in 
the “adapted” fabrication of two key variables that inform the 
international policy of Education For All: the number of pupils, which 
enters for example into the calculation of the school enrolment rate of a 
locality6, and the overall repetition rate of the school, which is an 
ingredient for measuring the internal efficiency of the education system. 
In doing so, I study the local arena of the school in the context of the 
“new global school order” (Lange, 2003; Laval and Weber, 2002) 
promoting universal basic education not only as an objective in itself, as a 
human right, but also as one of the main instruments  and indicators  of 
poverty reduction and economic and human development (Bianchini, 
2008; Cusso, 2008). In this context, governance through structural 
                                                                
4 See also Fichtner (2014a). 
5 According to Merry (2011: S90) the “turn to indicators is part of a new form of governance, 
one that engages the person in governing himself or herself in terms of standards set by 
others. This new form of governance emphasizes "responsibilization", in which individuals are 
induced to take responsibility for their actions […]. In some of the most successful examples, 
such as grades in school, the indicator comes to shape subjectivity, defining for the individual 
his or her degree of merit”.  
6 According to the commonly accepted statistical definition, the (primary) enrolment rate 
refers to the ratio of the number of children enrolled in primary school who belong to the age 
group that officially corresponds to primary schooling (numerator), divided by the total 
population of the same age group (denominator). This ratio is in fact called “net enrolment 
rate” (Gérard and Pilon, 2005: 202). 
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adjustment and conditional austerity of the 1980s and 1990s has been 
replaced  at least in development discourse  by governance based on 
“voluntary funding initiatives” implying models of “partnership” such as 
the Fast Track For Education For All (Samuel, 2013: 263)7. These initiatives 
are accompanied by instruments that measure their impact through 
comparable indicators in order to support the definition of precise policy 
orientations and their implementation from a distance.  
It is not our primary concern to discuss the “poor quality” of statistics 
(Jerven, 2013), as not necessarily representing a reliable instrument for 
informing and monitoring (macro) educational policy or for changing local 
practices (although my case studies also show that this is the case). Rather, 
my intention is to focus on the (micro)political processes (Ball, 1987) by 
which local actors, namely the school principal and the parents committee, 
make, manipulate and “adapt” school statistics. Through this process, 
these actors follow their own interests by exploiting the “room for 
manoeuvre” built into the “remote” control of the school arena. Far from 
presenting a harmonious space, this arena proved to be “a place of 
concrete confrontations of social actors interacting on common issues” 
(Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1998: 262), a “zone of negotiation” 
(Rottenburg, 2002: 234) around “representation practices” (ibid.: 14).  
Addressing the day-to-day functioning of the school through its 
“practical norms” (Olivier de Sardan, 2014: 407) and grasping the “real” 
comportment of its actors by analyzing its encrypted and listed 
bureaucratic procedures, makes it possible to differentiate analytically 
between the actual management of the school from its image presented 
on paper. The production of statistics is not only a tool for informing the 
State, NGOs and technical and financial partners on the school’s 
functioning or progress; it is also a tool of local governance in a globalized 
context. It shapes the relationship between the school principal and 
parents, the funding mechanisms of the school, and the provision of 
                                                                
7 The Education For All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative was launched in 2002 and is administered by 
the World Bank. It brought together all major donors and developing countries whose 
strategy for achieving the EFA goals, developed in their National Education Plans, was 
considered “good” and “credible”. In 2011 the initiative was renamed the Global Partnership 
for Education, see www.globalpartnership.org (accessed 20/03/2015). 
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textbooks and food for the school canteen. Through the creation of classes 
and manipulation of repetition rates, the production of statistics impacts 
on wider school selection processes. In this sense, the fabrication of 
statistics constitutes a “political technology of the self” through which 
actors manage and justify their actions which impact on their material 
situation as well as on their reputation and career. For instance, they open 
new classes and inflate numbers to increase the enrolment rate in “their” 
school and they select repeaters to improve “their” success rate in exams. 
I cover these two examples of the fabrication of statistics in the two 
sections below. 
My ethnographic research of 12 months in 2012/13 and 2014 consisted 
of participant observation of the school’s daily life, the consultation of 
school documents, and semi-structured interviews and conversations with 
actors in the school arena (the school principal, teachers, parents, pupils, 
NGOs, local authorities, administrators, but also representatives from the 
Ministry of Education and the office in charge of education at the level of 
the département, consultants, experts and representatives of international 
organizations). The long duration of my fieldwork made it possible to grasp 
the process of the creation and “adaptation” of school statistics from the 
beginning of the school year until the end. 
The “adapted” calculation of the number of pupils 
Statistics relating to the number of pupils have always been major 
representation and control techniques for the administrative management 
of educational institutions, both at national and local levels. First, they 
guide the creation of teaching posts, inform the school budget, and shape 
the allocation of equipment or the construction of classrooms. Second, 
statistics on pupil numbers inform the State and its international 
“partners” about the development of the school population. Finally, they 
provide information on the “moral situation” of the school institution 
(Briand, Chapoulie and Peretz, 1979: 672). Under the influence of NGOs 
and donors, who increasingly act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Fichtner, 
2012), this moral situation does not only present itself through the 
“healthy” image of the school with a growing number of boys and girls 
attending class. It is also defined by its transparent, democratic and 
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participatory government, its “good governance”, which should include 
parents. These parents are “responsibilized” by actors of development 
projects (Merry, 2011: S90) to get involved in the management of the 
school (including its quantified management), with the aim of achieving 
development goals, such as girls’ education or women’s participation in 
school matters. This approach may create conflicts between parents and 
school staff, especially if management is linked to financial issues thus 
creating “technical work in a situation of extraversion” (Samuel, 2013: 
271). In addition, the indicators of school development present a stake in 
(self) control of one’s teaching career or a tool of “self-management” 
(Bruno and Didier, 2013), described here for the case of the school 
principal of Alafia8. 
The village called Alafia is located in the north-east of Benin, about 
25 km from the administrative centre of the municipality. In 2013 it 
counted about 1,175 inhabitants in Alafia Bariba in the centre and 
4,757 inhabitants in the surrounding Fulani camps9. Its school was officially 
founded in 1989 with 43 pupils, including 13 girls. The nearest 
neighbouring primary school is seven kilometres away; a nursery and 
secondary school 22 km. The village, which does not have electricity or 
running water, is considered “remote” and “disadvantaged” by the school 
administration10. 
The schooling cycle in Alafia has been carried out for a long time on a 
biennial basis with a new cohort of pupils every two years. This is due to 
the lack of teachers, pupils and classrooms in rural areas. Normally in 
Benin, six primary classes (one for each grade) are operated at the same 
time: the introductory course (CI), the preparatory course (CP), the 
elementary level 1 and 2 (CE1/CE2) and the medium level 1 and 2 
(CM1/CM2). However, in Alafia one CI, one CE1 and one CM1 class were 
opened one year; then, the following year, a CP, a CE2 and a CM2 were 
opened. The effect of this policy was that repeating pupils were often 
                                                                
8 See also Fichtner (2014b), Fichtner and Jarroux (2015). 
9 The sedentary Bariba or Baatombu and the semi-nomadic Fulani represent the two largest 
social groups in this field of research (Boesen, Hardung and Kuba, 1998). 
10 For a general portrait of this school and its functioning on a daily basis, see the 
documentary film by Fichtner and Yaméogo (2014). 
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placed in a grade lower than the grade they were to repeat, and 
consequently fell behind by two school years instead of just one. Some 
therefore left school because of demotivation11. The biennial recruitment 
is still effective in many rural schools despite the announcement by the 
Beninese government that it would ensure the continuity of education 
over the six years of primary school in line with the objectives of its Ten-
Year Education Sector Development Plan (PDDSE) 2006-201512. 
Abandoning the biennial recruitment system is presented as linked to the 
goal of gradually increasing the national gross enrolment rate for the CM2 
from 54% in 2005 to 110% in 2015 (République du Bénin, 2006: 94)13. 
In Alafia, since the construction of a second school building in 2000, it 
became possible to operate five classes simultaneously, plus one 
additional class held in a straw shed, if there were enough children to 
attend and if teaching staff were available, which was not the case every 
year. The Minister of Primary Education had in fact announced a deficit of 
10,000 trained teachers in Benin in 2012/13 (Anonrin, 2013) to teach 
children in accordance with the international guidelines used in his 
decennial plan (40 pupils per class, one teacher per class (République du 
Bénin, 2006: 71))14. 
Given the problems associated with the biennial system, it is in the 
interest of the parents and the principal to open as many classes as 
possible and to present a growing number of pupils in order to be eligible 
                                                                
11 For example, out of 73 students who started the CI in 2007/08 in Alafia, only 15 entered the 
CM2 in 2012/13. 
12 The 2006-2015 Ten-Year Education Sector Development Plan (PDDSE) was drafted by the 
Government of Benin in order to benefit from a US$ 76.1 million support from the Fast Track 
initiative from 2008 onwards. 
13 The gross admission rate is the ratio between the number of pupils admitted to a class 
regardless of their age and the population of the official age of admission to the cycle. The 
diagnostic study RESEN initiated by the Ministry in charge of primary education in 2014 and 
carried out by the Pôle de Dakar, states that 20% of pupils in Benin attend a school that does 
not offer the six classes foreseen. In 14.5% of schools in the country (27.3% in Borgou/Alibori 
where the village of Alafia is located), the continuity of school education is not guaranteed 
according to the study (République du Bénin and Pôle de Dakar, 2014: 90). 
14 The shortage of teachers, or rather the State’s hiring of enough trained teachers and their 
equitable distribution between areas perceived as disadvantaged or developed, has always 
been a problem in Benin (Tama, 2014). 
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for the authorization to have additional classes, receive state subsidies, 
recruit more teachers and obtain means to build supplementary 
classrooms. Parents wished to enrol their children as early as possible  
and avoid the risk of repetition over several years caused by biennial 
recruitment. The principal wished to be recognized by the village 
population and the school administration as the principal who developed 
and “completed” the school with a sixth grade before pursuing his career 
elsewhere. 
The extension of the school in Alafia was thus part of the “career plan” 
of this young principal, son of a Baatonu farmer from the administrative 
centre of the municipality, who rapidly passed one career step after the 
next since obtaining his BEPC secondary school diploma and entering the 
teaching profession in 2003. After attending the teacher training college 
and obtaining the certificate of professional aptitude for education, he 
gained his first post as a school principal in Alafia in 2011/12. With the 
desire to become school inspector and in order to “leave the right traces”, 
he cultivated his reputation, his political and administrative networks, and 
his relations with the parents, even though they were sometimes “difficult 
to manage”, as he said.  
The parents’ association was a “privileged partner in school co-
management” (République du Bénin, 2012). However, relations between 
the principal and the parents were sometimes conflicting, in particular 
because of the parents associations’ relations with development actors 
who supervised them and disseminated their norms and “modes of 
associative governance” at the local level (Olivier de Sardan, 2009: 17)15. 
In Alafia, the parents’ committee had been supported since 2011 by the 
NGO World Education as part of its Community in Action for Girls’ 
Education (CAEF) program, funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The project asked the parents’ 
association to integrate a woman into their executive office, to found  
an association of pupils’ mothers  perceived as an engine for girls’ 
schooling , to draw up a list of names of children to be enrolled in school 
                                                                
15 For other studies on parents’ associations in West Africa, see for example Comhaire (2010), 
Petit and Comhaire (2010). 
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on the basis of a household survey in the village, and to organize itself for 
the follow-up. If the number of children of school age was large enough, 
the project supported the request for the opening of an introductory 
course (CI) omitting the biennial recruitment order, and promised to 
provide the necessary tables and benches. However, as the principal felt 
excluded from this procedure, he demanded to check the list drawn up by 
the parents before it was sent to the school district administration.  
To increase the number of pupils from the previous year (208 pupils in 
five classes), it was necessary to be able to open at least five classes in 
2012/13, partly under thatched roofs, until a new school building was built. 
“And for that, the chances of success are not bad now”, explained the 
principal. A Chinese company, which at that time tarred the main road in 
the centre of the municipality, had promised to help by building a few 
school buildings, supporting the Benin government’s goal of creating 
33,026 new classrooms between 2006 and 2015 to facilitate access to 
education for all and raise the gross enrolment rate16 from 94% in 2005 to 
125% in 2015 (République du Bénin, 2006: 96, 163). With the parents’ 
association and the teaching staff (a permanent state agent, a contract 
teacher and a “community” teacher recruited and paid by the parents), the 
principal decided to go “until the end”, that is to say, engage in the 
opening of six classes, despite difficulties in mobilizing parents to build a 
straw shed and finding additional teachers17. At the end of October 2012, 
the principal presented the first of three statistical reports to be completed 
at the beginning, middle and end of the school year. These reports then 
needed to pass through the offices of the superior administration, namely 
the school district, the directorate of primary education at departmental 
                                                                
16 The gross enrolment rate corresponds to the “number of students enrolled in a given level 
of education, regardless of their age, expressed as a percentage of the population of the 
theoretical age group corresponding to this level of education” (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics: http://www.uis.unesco.org, accessed 26/02/2016). The gross enrolment rate may 
exceed 100% without indicating that universal enrolment has been completed; this shows 
either a high repetition rate or a large number of students who are statistically “too young” 
and/or “too old” in relation to their level of education (which may in itself be a factor or a 
result of repetition practices) (Gérard and Pilon, 2005: 203). 
17 On the question of the management and distribution of teachers at the local level in Benin, 
see also Fichtner and Jarroux (2015). 
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level, and the Ministry’s planning and foresight department. On this first 
“start of school year report” were the names of 82 potential pupils 
(42 girls) for the new CI, based on the calculations that the parents’ 
committee had provided for the CAEF project. The total number of pupils 
at the school was, according to this report, 257 pupils (122 girls). 
At the beginning of January, 61 pupils, including 30 girls, and 
34 repeaters began their introductory class in a shed built by the parents. 
The principal explained to me that the difference between the numbers 
from October (82) and from January (61) was due to the fact that some of 
the pupils had to be rejected because of their young age and that in any 
case the October list would always be treated as an estimate. In January 
2013, the school’s total number of pupils had been reduced to 202 
(including 89 girls), six pupils less than in the previous year. These figures 
were also included in the principal’s second report: the “annual primary 
school census record”, transmitted to the school administration in April 
2013. 
Despite the overall “decline” in pupil numbers, the CI class was formally 
approved as one of five authorized classes, which meant that the principal 
received, as for all officially approved classes, the amount of FCFA 150,000 
(~ € 228) for the purchase of educational materials and a monthly 
“allowance” of FCFA 1,000 (~ € 1.50) per class. This subsidy was not related 
to the “real” number of pupils indicated by the principal, but based on the 
desirable standard of 40 pupils per class defined in the PDDSE (République 
du Bénin, 2006: 71). On the other hand, the calculation of the salary of the 
community teacher paid by the parents, who had been appointed to teach 
the new class, depended on the total number of pupils in Alafia and was a 
source of permanent conflict between the parents, the community teacher 
and the school principal. Officially, the recruitment of community teachers 
has been forbidden since the campaign to reintegrate them in the contract 
teacher system in 2008 and in accordance with the principle of gratuity 
decreed in 2006 by the government. However, in 2012 at least 
2,700 community teachers were still declared and tolerated in Beninese 
schools (Bogino and Sack, 2012: 17). 
In July 2013, the community teacher was only paid for five instead  
of seven months. His monthly salary amounted to FCFA 30,000 (~ € 46). 
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When I noticed that the total of FCFA 2,000 collected per pupil (~ € 3, an 
amount defined in consensus during the general assembly of the school), 
exceeded by far the amount of the community teacher’s annual salary 
(2000 x 202 = FCFA 404,000 (~ € 611), the salary being FCFA 210,000 
(~ € 318)), the principal explained that the school’s total number of pupils 
was lower than 202 and that there were financial issues that he could not 
address, which were “internal business”. According to my class 
observations there were around 177 pupils at school, but according to the 
“year-end report” completed by the principal in July 2013, there were 
194 pupils in total (including 84 girls). However, even with this “adapted” 
number, the parents’ association, together with the principal, could use 
part of the budget collected from the parents for other purposes if 
everyone paid. 
The use of statistics for collective financial or material gain was not 
unknown to the government educational administration. The inspector, a 
direct superior of the principal, explained:  
“The reliability of school statistics that the principals send us is really 
a problem. Since the food [for the canteens] is being sent in 
proportion to the number of pupils [...], the principals try to 
manipulate statistics to have pupils in all classes in order to get 
enough food. And then they get into an embarrassing situation 
because it is necessary to maintain these same statistics, that they 
gave in relation to the canteen, to the school [exam] 
administration.” 
The deputy head of school organization and planning at the directorate 
at departmental level added:  
“Staff at the local school district administration are trained to fill in 
the forms with the principals. Afterwards, it is up to us to go on the 
ground to check the forms and to check them in the schools. We 
even go into classes to count pupils and there we realize that the 
principals inflate the numbers. We call them to the DDEMP 
(Departmental Directorate of Maternal and Primary Education) to 
force them to correct their figures. And when they are forced to 
move for that, they soon learn that it is not good. That’s how we 
manage it. [...] But it is true that our missions are complicated. From 
time to time you have to travel by motorbike, without the necessary 
means... Then, you govern by checking a sample of schools.”  
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So-called “bush schools”, such as that in Alafia, are not often included 
in this sample. In 2012/13 there was no check on its statistics. 
The fabrication of statistics therefore becomes an act of “juggling” to 
present a realistic and harmonious image of the progressive development 
of the school and its “good governance”, as well as to achieve the different 
objectives (financial, careerist) of the actors involved in its production. 
Control by numbers of school management, its evolution and its “moral 
situation”, was established to address the mistrust of the government and 
manage its geographical distance from schools (Porter, 1995: ix; 
Rottenburg, 2002: 217). However this technique is limited by the 
instrumental character of the figures in the school arena and is hence an 
insufficient means for verification of what actually goes on inside the 
school. The different reports of pupil numbers in Alafia produced by 
parents and the principal constitute micro-political tools in a precarious 
situation in relation to the need for teachers and classrooms. The 
“informal” context of the community teachers’ recruitment favours the use 
of statistics to “capture” funding and other benefits. At the same time, it is 
the necessity of a “partnership” model of school management, and the 
requirement to present a growing school record, that produce these 
“register politics” (Rottenburg, 2002: 182; Samuel, 2013). These practices 
do not necessarily aim “to establish their objectivity by conformity to an 
external reality, but by their conformity with the rules of a development 
project”, common in the “world of aid” according to Rottenburg (2002: 
180). However, even if these figures are described as “poor numbers” 
(Jerven, 2013), as weak representatives of reality, they have real effects on 
the actors concerned. They provide schools with access to additional 
resources such as the donation of the tables and benches for the new CI 
through the CAEF project18. Moreover, as political tools of self-
management (Shore and Wright, 2000: 62), they can influence the 
reputation of the principal, the main person responsible for the local 
production of “his” school’s statistics. 
                                                                
18 Curiously, by supporting the opening of a new class through parental engagement, the NGO 
aimed to increase the schooling rate in the village and, in particular, that of girls. In fact, girls 
had represented almost half of the total number of pupils for some years. The NGO’s work 
was thus more a matter of maintaining a standard than of introducing it... 
The Local Fabrication of School Statistics 
Anthropologie & développement n° 48-49 / 2018 55 
Repetition policies, practices and statistics 
Several issues discussed above in the calculation of pupil numbers in 
school also emerge from the analysis of the policies, practices and 
quantified descriptions of repetition rates at national and local level in 
Benin. In addition, the case of repetition shows the changing impact of 
international expertise on educational policies and their representations. 
What used to be a “normal” pedagogical tool has become a problem under 
the auspices of international experts, which must be “hidden” in the 
statistical registers, even though this “problem” continues to be perceived 
locally as a selection technique which helps to maintain the standard of 
success for schools and its staff in a competitive environment. The logics 
and practices of repetition management “for real” and on paper navigate 
between official standards influenced by discourses on the economic 
productivity of the developmental framework of Education For All, and 
“practical norms” (Olivier de Sardan, 2014: 407) oriented towards the 
institutional efficiency of the school as envisaged by local actors. 
At the first staff meeting in October 2012, the principal had not only an 
idea of the actual and desirable numbers of teachers and pupils in the 
school, but also of their actual and desirable distribution across different 
classes. He analyzed the results of the final exam from the previous year, 
created lists, compared them, counted pupils, sent them from one class to 
another, and corrected the lists. This process took several weeks. There 
were repeaters in all classes. In the CI, there were 34 repeaters among the 
61 pupils enrolled, despite the prohibition of repetition in the CI grade 
defined by a decree in 2004 (République du Bénin, 2004). This decree was 
inspired by the recommendations of international experts arguing that the 
introductory course should simply make it possible for children to become 
accustomed to French-language instruction and that the content would be 
repeated and thoroughly examined in the following grade CP. 
Furthermore, the repetition between the sub-cycles of CE1/CE2 and 
CM1/CM2, introduced as a new structure in 2004, is not officially 
prohibited, but is also not recommended by the Beninese government, on 
the advice of donors who have “problematized” repetition practices from 
the 1980s onwards (DANIDA, AFD and République du Bénin, 2012: 82; 
République du Bénin and Pôle de Dakar, 2014: 31; World Bank, 2002: 55). 
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This “problematization” is part of a discourse on the effectiveness and 
profitability of the school in the context of Education For All policies 
(Bernard, Simon and Vianou, 2005; Normand, 2006). 
National repetition rates in Benin, that ranged from 24% to 30% 
between 1992 and 2004 (INSAE, 2012; République du Bénin, 2003: 137), 
were considered by international partners to be too high compared to 
other (especially Anglophone) countries in the region, and too costly in 
economic and psychological terms19. Following the ban on repetition at the 
CI level in January 2004, and the implementation of the policy that pupils 
automatically pass within sub-cycles (i.e. from CI to CP, from CE1 to CE2, 
and from CM1 to CM2), the national repetition rate fell to 17% in 2005 and 
to 8% according to the government (10% according to the Pôle de Dakar) in 
2006 before rising to 13% according to the government (16% according to 
the Pôle de Dakar) in 2011 (INSAE, 2012; République du Bénin and Pôle de 
Dakar, 2014: 126)20. The international benchmark to be reached in 2015, 
which is included in Benin’s sectoral plan, is fixed for 10% (République du 
Bénin, 2006: 79). 
If we look at the situation in Alafia’s school, neither the prohibition of 
repetition at the CI nor the automatic passage between sub-cycles were 
applied. In the various statistical sheets which the principal had completed 
at different times of the school year, the repetition rate varied between 
20% and 28% for the total number of pupils. Regarding the distribution of 
repeaters in the various classes, the lists showed different figures for 
different classes which deviated from the “real” number of repeaters. At 
the beginning of the school year there were 34 repeaters in CI, 12 in CP, 
0 in CE1, 15 in CE2 and 12 in CM1, thus 73 repeaters in total. On the annual 
census sheet completed in April 2013, there were no repeaters in CI, 9 in 
                                                                
19 Various studies explain the high rate of repetition in Francophone and Portuguese-speaking 
countries in comparison with Anglophone countries in Africa by the colonial legacy of a wider 
shared acceptance of repetition as a pedagogical tool in France, Belgium and Portugal 
(Bernard, Simon and Vianou, 2005: 20; Charton, 2012: 14; CONFEMEN, 2011: 72). 
20 It is very common to see a difference between the statistics published by the State and 
those published by international organizations, without any explanation of these differences 
for instance in relation to their databases. 
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CP, 0 in CE1, 11 in CE2 and 20 in CM1, thus 40 in total and with a different 
distribution across grades. 
The principal explained to me the “real” repetition practices in the CI, 
which were not on the census list, arguing that the children are “very 
immature”, often educated too early at the age of four instead of six 
years21 because of the absence of a nursery school in the village. Until the 
opening of the CI, the 34 repeaters had been tolerated as “free auditors” in 
the CP. However, they were not integrated into the course. The same thing 
happened to the 15 repeaters of the CE2, who found themselves without 
an authorized class. Initially they were placed in the CE1 as passive 
auditors, foreseen to spend a school year before repeating the CE2. 
However, throughout the school year, the principal encouraged the CE1 
teacher to practice multi-grade teaching (whereby pupils in grades CE1 and 
CE2 were taught in the same class under the same teacher). In fact, he 
created a sixth unofficial class, so that by the end of the school year, 10 of 
the 15 pupils of CE2 passed into CM1 and only five were repeating another 
year. 
According to the principal and the teachers of Alafia, the level of pupils 
was too low for an “automatic passage”, as was recommended between 
grades. In other words, if the pupils did not repeat, the higher grade 
teachers who would receive them would have additional difficulties 
because they would not have the capacity to respond specifically to the 
needs of “weak” pupils. Those children who did not exceed 50% of the 
20 points to be reached in the monthly and quarterly evaluations had to 
repeat, even between sub-cycles. The principal looked particularly at the 
17 candidates who entered his final class, the CM2. Pupils who had already 
repeated several times were, if necessary, expelled from school: “They will 
infect others with their weak points. Here, one should note: end of 
schooling!” he said. Successful completion of the final exam by his pupils 
was very important in measuring and assessing his “success” as a teacher 
and principal in competition with other schools. If less than 20% of his 
                                                                
21 The age of the children is often estimated, most of them not having a birth certificate until 
the end of primary school, when it becomes a necessary document in order to register for the 
final exam. 
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pupils passed the final exam, he was likely to be questioned by his 
superiors. 
The practice of repetition is in this context not a pedagogical resource 
to help pupils develop at their own pace, but rather a means of selection to 
create a homogeneous level among the pupils in the classroom, which 
allowed for a certain success rate in exams, and helped to retain the 
reputation of the school and its staff. In fact, the key concept which 
informed the principal’s actions was “school effectiveness”. This is not 
measured in terms of economic costs per pupil, the key measure for 
international agencies such as UNESCO and the World Bank, which 
calculate the efficiency and effectiveness of education systems on a global 
scale, but in terms of success in exams (which does not necessarily reflect 
the skills acquired by the pupils (Normand, 2006)). The principal was 
aware, however, that his selective practice was contrary to the slogan “No 
Child Left Behind” of the official policy inspired by the educational practice 
in the United States. It was based on the perception that a system that 
values only performance needs support and catch-up measures (Vinokur, 
2008: 6). “Yayi Boni said: there is no exclusion”, the principal said, quoting 
the Beninese president. “Every child should have the right to receive 
education according to his needs.” However, this was according to him 
incompatible with the demands and realities of the terrain. The production 
of statistics is, in this sense, once again, more of a micro-political “listing” 
technology (Rottenburg, 2002: 182) of the school and the self-
management of its actors, than an indicator and a credible instrument of 
international and national education policies. The figures “on paper” gave 
little information on concrete practices, but both contributed to the 
production of school realities. 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the “adapted” fabrication of pupil numbers and repetition rates 
at the micro level of the school in Alafia opens a perspective for 
understanding how actors make, represent and govern their school by 
numbers in the context of the global initiative of Education For All. The fact 
that both of these numbers are data that feed into composite indicators 
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and (micro)political instruments makes their readability and “objective” or 
bureaucratic use outside of their production context difficult. 
The framework for the accelerated implementation of the Education 
For All (EFA-Fast Track) objective, designed around the keywords of 
educational partnership, voluntarism and efficiency, implies a change in 
development politics with regard to the function of school statistics. 
According to this logic, the giving of aid is legitimized on political will 
geared towards achieving educational progress (increasing numbers of 
pupils enrolled, decreasing repetition rates), as expressed in national plans 
and through the implementation of benchmarks and measures to achieve 
them. It is not the red figures (“deficits”) that push international partners 
to intervene and provide support, but the black figures (“assets”); the 
“good” numbers. The implicit requirement of “good” numbers by these 
policies does not necessarily lead to one “realistic” image of the school 
situation, which would then constitute an “objective” basis for the steering 
of educational systems and data-based decision making. Instead, it leads to 
small arrangements by actors at different levels, favouring the disguise of 
reality and producing several paper realities, legitimizing the different 
objectives of the actors involved in the school arena. 
In the example of the negotiation of pupil numbers in Alafia, the non-
governmental partners of the CAEF project delegated to parents the 
responsibility of the creation of a new introductory class (CI) and the 
management of the community teacher, according to their own standards 
of “associative” governance. As for the school principal, in order to run his 
school, manage the budgetary stakes and develop his career positively 
through a “healthy” school, he demanded to regain control of the 
fabrication of the CI class, both on lists and in practice. Thus, school 
statistics are not only used to report and inform about school situations, 
they also present resources and conditions of control  and thus 
bureaucratic power  for various actors. Remote government control over 
isolated areas, and international projects’ control of school development, 
is limited  or in fact challenged  by school principals’ locally-exercised 
control of the representation of their institutions. 
These aspects are also visible through the example of the policies and 
practices of repetition. Here we see the changing prescriptive influences of 
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international expertise on national education policy and its management at 
the local level. These influences are manifested on paper in education 
sectoral development plans and school statistics, but they do not 
necessarily affect the practices of the actors on the ground, and if they do, 
not in the way desired by the initiators of these policies. The practice of 
the biennial recruitment is, for example, one of the factors compromising 
the fabrication of a school according to official standards; a factor that 
does not appear at first sight in the statistics. However, the “real” school 
cannot be understood simply as a deviance from the “ideal/imagined” 
school. The two are intimately linked in the (self) governing discourses and 
practices of their actors, as in their quantified images. 
Understanding the logics underlying the local fabric of school statistics 
is indicative of the limitations of the management of education systems by 
the technologies of quantification and the evaluation of EFA goals by the 
indicators derived from them. Understanding the complexity of the chain 
of production, transformation and (re)composition of these indicators, and 
their political entanglements between the local and the global, is a goal 
that deserves to be pursued through further field research. This article was 
only able to illuminate this process at the level of the school arena, the first 
link in this chain, which, nonetheless, is understudied in the analysis of 
school statistics. However, following the trajectories of numbers from  
their “origins” in the office of a school principal, through the various 
decentralised and central government educational administrations, to the 
data tables produced in the UNESCO or the World Bank’s statistical 
institutes, promises to be rich in insights on the contextualized political 
manipulation of the technologies of neo-liberal bureaucracy today. 
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